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"American Imperialism":
A Practitioner's Experience with
ExtraterritorialEnforcement of the FCPA
Charles F. Smitht
Brittany D. Parling

INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which makes unlawful the bribery of foreign government officials for the purpose
of obtaining or retaining business, became law in 1977.1 But it
took almost thirty years for the regulatory agencies charged with
enforcing the statute-the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)-to
enforce its restrictions against a non-US company. In 2006, a
Norwegian company, Statoil ASA, agreed to pay $21 million in
combined DOJ and SEC fines and penalties to settle an FCPA
enforcement action based upon alleged improper payments made
to secure a contract in Iran. 2 In the six years since that first
enforcement action against Statoil, there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of FCPA enforcement actions against
other foreign companies. These enforcement actions have resulted in multimillion-dollar settlements between US regulatory
agencies and a number of large foreign companies, including
Siemens AG (Germany),3 BAE Systems plc (United Kingdom), 4
t Mr. Smith and Ms. Parling are attorneys in the Chicago office of Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.
1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub L 95-213, 91 Stat 1494 (Dec 19, 1977).
2 See DOJ, Press Release, U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil Company that Bribed
Iranian Official (Oct 13, 2006), online at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/October/06
crm 700.html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
3 See DOJ, Press Release, Siemens AG and Three SubsidiariesPlead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec 15, 2008), online at http:I/www.justice.gov/opalpr/2008/December/08-crm1105.html (visited Sept 10, 2012); SEC, Press Release, SEC Charges Siemens AG for
Engaging in Worldwide Bribery (Dec 15, 2008), online at http://www.sec.govinews/press/
2008/2008-294.htm (visited Sept 10, 2012).
4 See DOJ, Press Release, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400
Million Criminal Fine (Mar 1, 2010), online at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/March/
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and Daimler AG (Germany).5
Does enforcing the FCPA against foreign companies unfairly
impose a US value system on the rest of the world? How does
this type of "extraterritorial" FCPA enforcement affect the way
the rest of the world views the United States? And how does that
affect the way companies do business in the United States? In
this Article, we evaluate the recent trend in FCPA enforcement
against foreign companies. In particular, we explore the development and legitimacy of what could be labeled "American
imperialism" in the FCPA context. Part I sets forth the statutory
basis for holding foreign companies liable under the FCPA. Part
II evaluates the recent trend in FCPA enforcement against foreign companies by discussing a few notable examples, including
Statoil, Siemens, BAE Systems, and Daimler. Part III focuses on
the legitimacy and practical implications of imposing US anticorruption laws on non-US companies. This Part also proposes some
adjustments to how these matters are handled that respect the
concerns of foreign companies, governments, and citizens. Finally, Part IV provides a brief conclusion.
I. BACKGROUND: THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR ENFORCING THE
FCPA AGAINST FOREIGN COMPANIES

Under the plain language of the FCPA, certain foreign companies may be subject to the statute's requirements. This Part
provides a brief background of the FCPA's substantive provisions
and discusses the statutory basis for enforcing those provisions
against foreign companies.
The FCPA consists of two provisions: the antibribery provision and the accounting provision.6 In general, the antibribery
provision prohibits any person or entity subject to the FCPA
from offering or paying anything of value to any foreign official,
foreign political party, or candidate for foreign political office for
the purpose of obtaining, retaining, or directing business to any
person.' The accounting provision requires entities to maintain
10-crm-209.html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
5 See DOJ, Press Release, DaimlerAG and Three SubsidiariesResolve Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Investigation and Agree to Pay $93.6 Million in Criminal Penalties (Apr
1, 2010), online at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/April/10-crm-360.html (visited Sept
10, 2012); SEC, Press Release, SEC Charges Daimler AG With Global Bribery (Apr 1,
2010), online at http://sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-51.htm (visited Sept 10, 2012).
6 For the antibribery provision, see 15 USC § 78dd-1. For the accounting provision,

see 15 USC § 78m.

7

15 USC

§ 78dd-1-3.
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accurate books and records8 and to create a system of internal
controls to ensure that transactions are properly authorized.9
A foreign company can be subject to both the antibribery
provision and the accounting provision. Both provisions apply to
an "issuer," that is, any entity that has a class of securities registered under Section 12 or that is required to file reports under
Section 15(D) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.10 Foreign
companies that meet either of these requirements are "issuers"
within the meaning of the FCPA. Although the accounting provision applies to all issuers, the antibribery provision includes an
additional jurisdictional hurdle: to be found liable under the
antibribery provision, an issuer must also "make use of the mails
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance" of the offer or payment."
Yet in other respects, the antibribery provision is potentially
broader in scope than the accounting provision. For example, the
antibribery provision applies to any person or entity that engages in an act within the territorial US in furtherance of a prohibited payment, regardless of whether that person or entity qualifies as an issuer. 12 This type of "territorial jurisdiction" may be
invoked, for example, when a person or entity uses an instrumentality of interstate commerce (such as a wire transfer of
funds through a bank located in the US) to facilitate a prohibited
payment.13 Moreover, in addition to the person or entity itself,
the antibribery provision applies to "any officer, director, employee, or agent" of any person or entity "or any stockholder
thereof acting on behalf of" any person or entity. 14 These provisions expand the ability of US regulators to enforce the FCPA's
antibribery provision against foreign companies and their
agents.

15 USC § 78m(b)(2)(A).
15 USC § 78m(b)(2)(B).
10 15 USC § 78dd-1; 15 USC § 78m(b)(2). For Section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, see 15 USC § 781. For Section 15(D), see 15 USC § 780(d).

11 15 USC § 78dd-1.
12 15 USC § 78dd-3. The antibribery provisions also apply to "domestic concerns,"
which includes US citizens and resident aliens as well as entities organized under US law
or having their principal place of business in the US. 15 USC § 78dd-2. This category
includes "any officer, director, employee, or agent of such domestic concern or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern." Id.
13 15 USC § 78dd-3.
14 15 USC § 78dd-1; 15 USC § 78dd-3.
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II. THE RECENT TREND OF FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
AGAINST FOREIGN COMPANIES

In recent years, both the DOJ and SEC have used the broad
language of the FCPA to enforce the antibribery and accounting
provisions against foreign companies. Since 2006, US regulators
have brought enforcement actions against numerous foreign
companies, including Siemens AG (Germany),15 BAE Systems plc
(United Kingdom),1 6 Daimler AG (Germany),17 Technip SA
(France),' 8 Snamprogetti Netherlands BV/ENI (Holland/Italy),19
ABB Ltd (Switzerland), 20 Panalpina World Transport (Holding)
Ltd (Switzerland), 2 1 Alcatel-Lucent SA (France),22 JGC Corpora15 See DOJ, Press Release, Siemens AG and Three SubsidiariesPlead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (cited in note 3); SEC, Press Release, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in
Worldwide Bribery (cited in note 3).
16 See DOJ, Press Release, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400

Million Criminal Fine (cited in note 4).
17 See DOJ, Press Release, DaimlerAG and Three SubsidiariesResolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay $93.6 Million in Criminal Penalties
(cited in note 5); SEC, Press Release, SEC Charges Daimler AG With Global Bribery
(cited in note 5).
18 See DOJ, Press Release, Technip S.A. Resolves Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (June 28, 2010), online at
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/June/10-crm-751.html (visited Sept 10, 2012); SEC,
Press Release, SEC Charges Technip with FCPA Violations (June 28, 2010), online at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-110.htm (visited Sept 10, 2012).
19 See DOJ, Press Release, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V Resolves Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (July 7,
2010), online at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/July/10-crm-780.html (visited Sept 10,
2012); SEC v ENI, SpA and Snamprogetti Netherlands, BV, Litigation Release No 21588
(SEC July 7, 2010), online at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/1r21588.htm
(visited Sept 10, 2012).
20 See DOJ, Press Release, ABB Ltd and Two SubsidiariesResolve Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Investigation and Will Pay $19 Million in Criminal Penalties (Sept 29,
2010), online at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/September/10-crm-1096.html (visited
Sept 10, 2012); SEC, Press Release, SEC Charges ABB For Bribery Schemes in Mexico
and Iraq (Sept 29, 2010), online at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-175.htm
(visited Sept 10, 2012).
21 See DOJ, Press Release, Oil Services Companies and a Freight ForwardingCompany Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More Than $156 Million
in Criminal Penalties (Nov 4, 2010), online at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
November/10-crm-1251.html (visited Sept 10, 2012). The DOJ charged Panalpina World
Transport (Holding) Ltd under the territorial jurisdiction provision of the FCPA. See
Information, United States v Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd, No 10-CR-765,
*19-25 (SD Tex filed Nov 4, 2010) ("Panalpina Information"). The SEC only brought an
enforcement action against Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd's US subsidiary,
Panalpina Inc. See SEC v Panalpina,Inc, Litigation Release No 21727 (SEC Nov 4,
2010), online at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21727.htm (visited Sept
10, 2012).
22 See DOJ, Press Release, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three SubsidiariesAgree to Pay
$92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Investigation (Dec 27, 2010), online
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tion (Japan),23 Deutsche Telekom AG (Germany), 24 and Magyar
Telekom PLC (Hungary).25 Indeed, according to one source,
"eleven of the twenty corporate matters brought in 2010 involved
non-U.S. companies." 26 These companies "were responsible for 94
percent of the penalties imposed on corporations in 2010."27 And
of the ten highest FCPA penalties recovered against corporate
defendants to date, nine were paid by foreign companies.2 8
This Part briefly discusses a few notable examples of FCPA
enforcement actions against foreign companies. We begin with
the first FCPA enforcement action against a foreign company,
Statoil. We then discuss the subsequent multimillion dollar enforcement actions against Siemens, BAE Systems, and Daimler,
all of which involved some of the highest FCPA penalties recovered against corporate defendants to date.
A.

Statoil ASA

The first foreign company to face an FCPA enforcement
action was Statoil ASA, an international oil company headquartered in Norway. 29 Because Statoil's shares were listed on the
New York Stock Exchange and registered under Section 12(b) of

at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/December/10-crm-1481.html (visited Sept 10, 2012);
SEC, Press Release, SEC Charges Alcatel-Lucent with FCPA Violations (Dec 27, 2010),
online at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-258.htm (visited Sept 10, 2012).
23 See DOJ, Press Release, JGC CorporationResolves Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct
Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $218.8 Million Criminal Penalty (Apr 6, 2011), online at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-431.html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
24 See generally DOJ, Deutsche Telekom Non-Prosecution Agreement (Dec 29, 2011),
online at http://www.justice.gov/criminallfraud/fcpa/cases/deutsche-telekom/2011-12-29deustche-telekom-npa.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012); Complaint, US Securities and Exchange
Commission v Magyar Telekom, PLC, and Deutsche Telekom, AG, No 11-Civ-9646 (SDNY
filed Dec 29, 2011) ("Magyar Complaint").
25 See generally Magyar Complaint (cited in note 24); Information, United States v
Magyar Telekom, Plc, No 1:11-CR-597 (ED Va filed Dec 29, 2011) ("Magyar Information");
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United State v Magyar Telekom, Plc, No 1:11-CR-597
(ED Va filed Dec 29, 2011).
26 Philip Urofsky and Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, FCPA Digest 1, 5 (Shearman & Sterling Jan 20, 2011), online at http://www
.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA-Trends-and-Patterns-Jan-2011.pdf (visited Sept 10,
2012).
27 Id at 6.

28 See Richard L. Cassin, With Magyar In New Top Ten, It's 90% Non-U.S. (FCPA
Blog Dec 29, 2011), online at http://www.fcpablog.comlblog/2011/12/29/with-magyar-innew-top-ten-its-90-non-us.html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
29 See DOJ, Press Release, U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil Company that Bribed
IranianOfficial (cited in note 2).
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the Exchange Act, the company qualified as an "issuer" within
the meaning of the FCPA.3 0
In October 2006, the DOJ and SEC charged Statoil with violations of both the antibribery and accounting provisions of the
FCPA. 31 The agencies alleged that Statoil made payments by
way of a US bank in New York to an Iranian official to assist
Statoil in obtaining a contract to develop portions of the South
Pars oil field in Iran and "to open doors to additional projects in
the Iranian oil and gas exploration industry."32
As part of a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ,
Statoil acknowledged responsibility for the bribe payments and
agreed to pay $10.5 million in penalties. 33 The company also
agreed to the appointment of an independent compliance consultant, who would review and periodically report on the company's FCPA compliance during the three-year term of the agreement. 34 In the related SEC proceeding, Statoil consented to entry
of an administrative order requiring the company to pay disgorgement of $10.5 million. 35 The order also required Statoil to
cease and desist from committing violations of the antibribery
and accounting provisions of the FCPA and to retain an independent compliance consultant. 36
Importantly, the US was not the only country to prosecute
Statoil for violation of its antibribery laws. The Norwegian
National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime ("Okokrim") also investigated
Statoil for its conduct in Iran.37 In June 2004, Okokrim charged
Statoil with violating Norway's trading-in-influence statute and

30 See Information, United States of America v Statoil ASA, No 06 Crim 960, *2
(SDNY filed Oct 13, 2006) ("Statoil Information"); Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist
Proceedings, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to
Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, In the Matter of Statoil ASA, No 312453, *2 (SDNY filed Oct 13, 2006) ("Statoil Cease-and-Desist Order").
31 See Statoil Information at *4-6, 9-10 (cited in note 30); Statoil Cease-and-Desist
Order at *2 (cited in note 30).
32 Statoil Information at *4-9 (cited in note 30). See also Statoil Cease-and-Desist
Order at *4-5 (cited in note 30).
33 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States of America v Statoil ASA, No
06 Crim 960, *14 (SDNY filed Oct 13, 2006). Statoil was not required to pay $3 million of
the $10.5 million penalty in consideration of the penalty the company already paid to
Norwegian authorities for the same conduct. See id at *14-15.
3 See id at *7-14.
3 See Statoil Cease-and-Desist Order at *12 (cited in note 30).
36 See id at *8-12.
3 See id at *7.
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issued penalty notices requiring Statoil to pay approximately $3
million. 38
Although Statoil's settlements with the DOJ and SEC involved relatively small penalties-specially compared to more
recent FCPA enforcement actions-the Statoil case is noteworthy
because it was the first time the DOJ and SEC brought FCPA
enforcement actions against a non-US company. As such, the
case signaled the beginning of a more aggressive enforcement
stance on the part of both agencies. The DOJ made that point
unmistakably clear. For example, Assistant Attorney General
Alice S. Fisher stated that,
Although Statoil is a foreign issuer, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act applies to foreign and domestic public companies alike, where the company's stock trades on American exchanges.

...

This prosecution demonstrates the

Justice Department's commitment vigorously to enforce
the FCPA against all international businesses whose conduct falls within its scope. 39
In a speech to the American Bar Association National Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Assistant Attorney
General Fisher again emphasized this point, stating that, "I
want to send a clear message today that if a foreign company
trades on U.S. exchanges and benefits from U.S. capital markets,
it is subject to our laws. The Department will not hesitate to enforce the FCPA against foreign-owned companies, just as it does
against American companies." 40
B.

Siemens AG

In December 2008, the DOJ filed a criminal information
against Siemens AG, a German manufacturer of industrial and
consumer equipment, and three of its subsidiaries for violation of
the FCPA's accounting provision.4 1 The SEC also filed a civil
complaint against Siemens for violation of the antibribery and
38 See id.

3 DOJ, Press Release, U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil Company that Bribed Iranian
Official (cited in note 2).
40 Remarks of Alice S. Fisher at the American Bar Association National Institute on
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 4 (Oct 16, 2006), online at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/pr/speechl2006/10-16-06AAGFCPASpeech.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
41 See Information, United States v Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No 08-CR-367-RJL,
*36-39 (DDC filed Dec 12, 2008) ("Siemens Information").
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accounting provisions. 42 These enforcement actions resulted from
the company's disclosure of FCPA violations to US authorities
after cooperating with DOJ and SEC investigations and conducting its own internal investigation.4 3 Both the DOJ and SEC alleged that Siemens was an "issuer" within the meaning of the
FCPA because its shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange and registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange
Act. 44
The court documents filed by the DOJ and SEC alleged that
Siemens engaged in systematic efforts to pay bribes to foreign
government officials to obtain business, falsified its corporate
books and records, and failed to maintain sufficient internal anticorruption controls.4 5 According to the SEC's civil complaint,
Siemens paid $1.4 billion in bribes to obtain business in countries such as Venezuela, Israel, Mexico, Bangladesh, Argentina,
Vietnam, China, and Russia.4 6
Siemens pleaded guilty to both counts of the criminal infor47
mation and agreed to a civil settlement with the SEC. Under
the terms of the criminal plea agreement, Siemens agreed to pay
a combined total fine of $450 million and to retain an independent compliance monitor for a four-year period. 48 To settle the
SEC's civil enforcement action, Siemens agreed to pay $350 million in disgorgement and to retain an independent compliance
monitor.49 The combined $800 million in US penalties was the

42 See Complaint, US Securities and Exchange Commission v Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No 1:08-CV-02167, *36-38 (DDC filed Dec 12, 2008) ("Siemens Complaint").
43 See DOJ, Press Release, Siemens AG and Three SubsidiariesPlead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (cited in note 3); SEC, Press Release, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in
Worldwide Bribery (cited in note 3).
44 See Siemens Information at *3 (cited in note 41); Siemens Complaint at *4 (cited in
note 42).
45 See Siemens Information at *1-2 (cited in note 41); Siemens Complaint at *1-3
(cited in note 42).
46 See Siemens Complaint at *2 (cited in note 42).
47 See DOJ, Press Release, Siemens AG and Three SubsidiariesPlead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (cited in note 3). See also SEC, Press Release, SEC Charges Siemens AG for
Engagingin Worldwide Bribery (cited in note 3).
48 See DOJ, Press Release, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (cited in note 3).
49 See SEC, Press Release, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide
Bribery (cited in note 3).
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largest monetary sanction ever imposed in an FCPA case against
either a US or a foreign company.5 0
As in the Statoil case, the US was not the only country to enforce its antibribery laws against Siemens. On the same day it
settled with the DOJ and SEC, Siemens agreed to pay C395 million, or approximately $569 million, to settle an investigation by
the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office based on the company's
failure to supervise its officers and employees.5 1 A year before, in
October 2007, Siemens had entered into a C201 million (approximately $287 million) settlement with the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office in connection with charges of bribery by the company's Telecommunications operating group. 52 Like Norway in
the Statoil case, then, Germany willingly enforced its own antibribery laws against a company headquartered in its own country.
C.

BAE Systems plc

In March 2010, BAE Systems plc, a defense contractor with
its headquarters in the United Kingdom, pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the US by making false statements about its
FCPA compliance program. 53 According to the criminal information, BAE falsely stated to the US Department of Defense and
US Department of State that it would create and implement policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the FCPA. 54 Instead of ensuring compliance with the FCPA, however, the information alleged that BAE made payments of over £135 million
and $14 million to "marketing advisors" through offshore shell
companies, even though there was a high probability that part of
the payments would be used to ensure that BAE was favored in
50 See DOJ, Press Release, Siemens AG and Three SubsidiariesPlead Guilty to Foreign CorruptPracticesAct Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (cited in note 3). In addition, in December 2011, the SEC and DOJ individually
charged several former Siemens executives with violating the FCPA. See SEC, Press
Release, SEC Charges Seven Former Siemens Executives With Bribing Leaders in Argentina (Dec 13, 2011), online at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-263.htm (visited
Sept 10, 2012).
51 See DOJ, Press Release, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (cited in note 3).

52 See id. .
. See DOJ, Press Release, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400
Million Criminal Fine (cited in note 4).
-1 See Information, United States v BAE Systems plc, No 1:10-CR-00035, *2 (DDC
filed Feb 4, 2010) ("BAE Information").
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foreign government decisions regarding the purchase of defense
articles.5 5 According to the information, these payments were not
subjected to the kind of internal scrutiny that BAE represented
they would be.5 6 BAE also allegedly concealed its relationships
with certain "marketing advisors" and the existence of these
payments.5 7
BAE pleaded guilty and was sentenced to pay a $400 million
criminal fine-one of the largest in FCPA history.5 8 BAE also
agreed to maintain a compliance program to detect and deter
violations of the FCPA and other anticorruption laws and to retain an independent compliance consultant for three years to
assess the program and report to the DOJ.5 9
Notably, the DOJ did not charge BAE with a violation of the
FCPA's antibribery or accounting provisions. 60 By charging BAE
with knowingly making false statements to the US government,
it was not necessary to allege that BAE was an "issuer" or subject to territorial jurisdiction under the FCPA. Indeed, it
appeared that the jurisdictional nexus to allege a violation of the
antibribery provisions may have been quite weak, as most of the
questionable payments were made outside of the US.61 The
DOJ's continued prosecution of BAE in the face of potential jurisdictional hurdles only serves to highlight the agency's aggressive enforcement of the FCPA against foreign companies. 62
55 See id at *7-9. See also DOJ, Press Release, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and
Orderedto Pay $400 Million CriminalFine (cited in note 4).
56 See BAE Information at *8 (cited in note 54).
57 See id at *8-9.
58 See DOJ, Press Release, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400
Million Criminal Fine (cited in note 4). The BAE penalty is the third-largest penalty in
FCPA history. See Cassin, With Magyar In New Top Ten, It's 90% Non-U.S. (cited in note
28).
59 See DOJ, Press Release, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400
Million CriminalFine (cited in note 4).
60 See BAE Information at *2 (cited in note 54).
61 See Steven A. Tyrrell, DOJ Prosecution of BAE Heralds Continued Aggressive
FCPA Enforcement Environment, Weil Briefing (Feb 8, 2010), online at http://www.weil
.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=9725 (visited Sept 10, 2012). See also Andrew Weissmann
and Alixandra Smith, Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 1, 4 (US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform 2010), online at http://www
.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/restoringbalance fcpa.pdf (visited Sept 10,
2012). The Information does allege that BAE made certain payments to an official of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia "through various payment mechanisms both in the territorial
jurisdiction of the US and elsewhere." BAE Information at *12 (cited in note 54). This is
the only reference to payments made within the territory of the United States. See generally id.
62 Another recent FCPA enforcement action illustrates the DOJ's aggressive enforcement stance in the face of jurisdictional issues. On December 29, 2011, Magyar Tele-
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Daimler AG

In April 2010, Germany-based automobile manufacturer
Daimler AG resolved charges relating to FCPA investigations
conducted by the DOJ and SEC. 63 Both the DOJ and SEC maintained that Daimler was subject to the FCPA by way of its status
as an "issuer" of stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange
and other US exchanges. 64 The DOJ also alleged that Daimler
was subject to territorial jurisdiction under the FCPA as a result
of its "use of U.S. bank accounts and U.S. companies in transacting certain business with foreign governments and officials."6 5
As part of the resolution of the DOJ's criminal investigation,
Daimler entered into a deferred prosecution agreement and
agreed to the entry of a criminal information charging the company with violating the FCPA's accounting provision.6 6 The criminal information charged that Daimler engaged in a longstanding
practice of paying bribes to foreign officials through a variety of
mechanisms, including corporate ledger accounts known as
"third party accounts," corporate "cash desks," offshore bank accounts, deceptive pricing arrangements, and third-party inter-

kom and its parent company Deutsche Telekom settled FCPA charges with the DOJ
based upon allegations that Magyar Telekom executives bribed Macedonian government
officials to delay the entrance of a third mobile license into the Macedonian telecommunications market and made improper payments in connection with Magyar Telekom's acquisition of a state-owned telecommunications company in Montenegro. See Deutsche
Telekom Non-Prosecution Agreement at *Al-A3 (cited in note 24); Magyar Information
at *7-12 (cited in note 24). Magyar Telekom agreed to pay a $59.6 million criminal penalty, while Deutsche Telekom agreed to pay a $4.36 million criminal penalty to resolve the
charges. For the Magyar penalty, see Magyar Telekom Deferred Prosecution Agreement
at *8 (cited in note 24). For the Deutsche Telekom fine, see Deutsche Telekom NonProsecution Agreement at *2 (cited in note 24). Although both Magyar Telekom and
Deutsche Telekom qualified as "issuers" under the FCPA, the only jurisdictional basis for
the DOJ's antibribery enforcement action appears to be two e-mails that passed through,
were stored on, and transmitted to servers located in the US. Magyar Information at *8-9
(cited in note 24).
63 See DOJ, Press Release, Daimler AG and Three SubsidiariesResolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay $93.6 Million in Criminal Penalties
(cited in note 5); SEC, Press Release, SEC Charges Daimler AG With Global Bribery
(cited in note 5).
64 See Information, United States v Daimler AG, No 1:10-CR-00063, *2-3 (DDC filed
Mar 22, 2010) ("Daimler Information"); Complaint, United States Securities and Exchange Commission v Daimler AG, No 1:10-CV-00473, *4 (DDC filed Mar 22, 2010)
("Daimler Complaint").
65 Daimler Information at *3 (cited in note 64).
66 See DOJ, Press Release, Daimler AG and Three SubsidiariesResolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay $93.6 Million in Criminal Penalties
(cited in note 5). See generally Daimler Information (cited in note 64).
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mediaries. 67 The information also alleged that, between 1998 and
January 2008,
Daimler made hundreds of improper payments worth tens
of millions of dollars to foreign officials in at least twentytwo countries-including China, Croatia, Egypt, Greece,
Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Latvia, Nigeria,
Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and others-to assist in
securing contracts with government customers for the
purchase of Daimler vehicles. 68
According to the information, "Daimler improperly recorded
these payments in its corporate books and records."69 Similarly,
the SEC complaint alleged that Daimler violated the antibribery
and accounting provisions of the FCPA by paying at least $56
million in bribes to government officials to further government
sales in at least twenty-two countries around the world over a
period of more than ten years. 70
As part of the deferred prosecution agreement, Daimler
agreed to pay a monetary penalty of $93.6 million and retain a
corporate compliance monitor.7 1 Daimler also agreed to pay $91.4
million in disgorgement and retain an independent compliance
consultant to settle the SEC's charges. 72 On May 14, 2010-just
over a month after Daimler resolved its cases with the DOJ and
SEC-Daimler announced that it was delisting its shares from
the New York Stock Exchange.7 3
III. A PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE: THE LEGITIMACY OF
EXTRATERRITORIAL FCPA ENFORCEMENT AND
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

This Part provides a practitioner's perspective on enforcement of the FCPA against foreign companies. Part IIIA provides
67 Daimler Information at *3 (cited in note 64).
68 Id.
69 Id at *4.
70 See Daimler Complaint at *2-4 (cited in note 64).
71 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v Daimler AG, No 1:10-CR00063, *6, *9-10 (DDC filed Mar 24, 2010).
72 See SEC, Press Release, SEC Charges Daimler AG With Global Bribery (cited in
note 5).
7 See Vanessa Fuhrmans and Laura Stevens, Symbolic Shift: Why Daimler, European Firms Want to Delist from U.S. Exchanges, Wall St J 22 (May 18, 2010). See also
Daimler AG, SEC Form 15F, File No 1-14561 (filed June 8, 2010).
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some examples, both from the press and our own experience, of
how the rest of the world views FCPA enforcement against foreign companies. Part IIIB discusses some of the unintended consequences of such an aggressive enforcement stance by the US
government. Finally, Part IIIC proposes some adjustments to
how these matters are handled that respect the concerns of foreign companies, governments, and citizens.
A.

How the World Views Us

Lawyers who practice antibribery law internationally are often asked the same questions: Why does the US believe that it
has the right to regulate the moral or business conduct of non-US
companies operating in some of the most corrupt countries in the
world? Is this in fact "American imperialism" run amok? Is it an
effort to impose peculiarly American standards of ethical conduct
on areas of the world that do not accept or operate by those
standards? Or, in a more sinister vein, is it an effort to tilt the
playing field in highly competitive industries by taking enforcement action against international companies that would never be
taken against their US competitors?
The last of these questions is the one we hear most often
when the US government is considering an enforcement action
against a foreign company. The Daimler investigation is an obvious example. Daimler's major US competitors, General Motors
and Ford, have never been the subject of an FCPA enforcement
action, notwithstanding the fact that they largely sell the same
kinds of vehicles through the same kinds of distribution networks in the same high-risk countries around the world. It is
reasonable for a German business person to question why the US
government devoted extensive resources for over half a decade to
prosecute a German competitor of the major American automakers.
A related issue is how people in other countries view law enforcement methods and tactics that are viewed as mainstream by
Americans. Again, Daimler is illustrative. The German press
focused much attention on the investigative tactics of the law
firm hired by Daimler to investigate allegations of wrongdoingtactics that would not be questioned in the US. One article, for
example, compared Daimler's own attorneys to "prosecutors,"
claiming that the attorneys had been searching for "incriminating material since August 2004-as a kind of deputy sheriff to
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the American stock exchange watchdogs in Germany." 74 Another
article also compared Daimler's attorneys to prosecutors,
except that [Daimler's attorneys] were not subject to the
same restrictions. They questioned managers in Germany, Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia, without having to
submit requests for legal assistance first. They searched
offices and confiscated computers without having to present search warrants.7 5
The SEC and DOJ investigations of Daimler also generated
intensely negative reactions from the German media. For example, the German press noted that,
[h]igh-ranking legal experts consider it "unimaginable"
that BaFin, the German banking and stock exchange supervisory authority, would similarly strong-arm American
global companies like Exxon or General Motors. Even the
Federal Ministry of Justice internally considers the actions of the SEC to be "extremely unpleasant."7 6
The press also noted that the SEC "not only has a hand in
deciding which [Daimler] manager may lead the department, but
the Americans can even send their own people to Stuttgart in
order to keep a closer watch on the corporate managers."7 7
Another more recent article from a German news magazine
cited the Daimler case as "an example of how German companies
can come under the control of American regulatory agencies."7 8
The article referred to the independent compliance monitor appointed as part of the settlements with the SEC and DOJ as having "almost as much power as a district attorney" and described
the company as being "on parole."7 9 Finally, the article noted that
senior Daimler executives "accuse the US authorities of using
7 Und Uncle Sam befiehlt, 38 Focus Magazin 212, 213-14 (Sept 18, 2006).
7 Dietmar Hawranek, US Investigators Crack Down on Daimler's Culture of Corruption, Spiegel Online International (Der Spiegel Mar 30, 2010), online at http://www.
spiegel.de/internationallbusiness/0,1518,686238,00.html (visited Sept 10, 2012) (Christopher Sultan, trans).
7 Und Uncle Sam befiehlt, 38 Focus Magazin at 214 (cited in note 74).
n Id at 216.
78 Dietmar Hawranek, Daimler Upset with Over-Eager American Oversight, Spiegel
Online International (Der Spiegel Dec 13, 2011), online at http://www.spiegel.de/
international/business/0,1518,803350,00.html (visited Sept 10, 2012) (Christopher Sultan,
trans).
79 Id.
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their extensive investigations to make it more difficult for German companies to do business."8 0
We believe the international criticism, as illustrated above,
arises primarily from (i) differences in nations' laws governing
the collection and use of personal information, (ii) a misunderstanding of the role a company's counsel plays in a US regulatory
investigation, and (iii) deeper issues of sovereignty.
1. Use of personal information.
First, it is fair to say that the US government is viewed as a
bull in a china shop when it comes to the protection and use of
personal information. Most countries have data privacy laws that
provide for extensive protection of personally identifying information. Germany, for example, prohibits the collection and use of
such information except for stated purposes, and the violation of
Germany's data privacy laws can lead to serious criminal consequences for individuals involved.81 Indeed, senior corporate executives have lost their jobs and have been prosecuted due to data
privacy violations that occurred on their watches. 82
The US has few such protections. If authorities want an employee's e-mail, for example, a cooperating company may produce
that e-mail without any subpoena and without providing any
notice to the employee. This would be inconceivable in Europe
and most other places in the world. The different notions of what
constitutes confidential personal information and the reduced
protection for that information is one source of criticism of US
investigation methods. One client exclaimed to us, when we explained to him that we could (and would) produce to the US government e-mails of hundreds of employees, "Are you not a country of laws?!"

80 Id.

81 See Federal Data Protection Act ("Bundesdatenschutzgesetz") Art V, § 44 (2009).
82 For example, in March 2009, Deutsche Bahn's CEO, Hartmut Mehdorn, resigned
and the company was fined C1.12 million for breaching data protection laws after allegations emerged that the company had spied on and monitored the e-mails of many of its
employees. See Keith Barrow, DB Reflects on Tough Times, International Railway Journal 31, 31 (Sept 1, 2010). See also Caroline Brothers, Scandal Topples Chief of Deutsche
Bahn, International Herald Tribune 16, 16 (Mar 31, 2009); Spy Scandal Rattles Deutsche
Bahn Top Managers, Spiegel Online International (Der Spiegel Feb 12, 2009), online at
(visited Sept 10,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,607206,00.html
2012). Other senior managers of the company also resigned in the wake of the scandal.
See DB Ushers in Grube Era as Resignations Continue, International Railway Journal 4,
4 (June 1, 2009).
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2. Role of counsel.
Second, the press coverage of the Daimler matter evidenced
a fundamental misunderstanding of the role the company's attorneys (our firm in that instance) play in a US regulatory investigation. When an investigation begins, often through an informal request for information from the SEC or DOJ, the company
will hire counsel to investigate issues and produce the information requested by the authorities. That attorney is counsel to
the company, not the SEC or DOJ; but it is very difficult for people outside the US to understand that distinction.
The difficulty in comprehending the role played by counsel
in these matters is understandable. Other countries often do not
have the same investigation structure-generally, if the government wants to investigate a company, the government uses its
own resources to do so. In addition, at times the SEC and DOJ
request that company counsel conduct the investigation in a way
that creates the appearance that counsel is not acting on behalf
of the company. For example, the agencies may request that
counsel appear at an employee's office unannounced and seize
paper files or computer hardware to reduce the risk of spoliation.
To company employees or others who witness this action, it may
seem that counsel is acting on behalf of the regulator rather than
the company. And, as a result, the view inside a company (and
outside, through press accounts) may be that the US government, through its "agents," is intruding into the operations of the
company in an aggressive and inappropriate way.
3. Respect of sovereignty.
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, the very action of
US authorities investigating and seeking to penalize a non-US
company raises questions about whether the US is overreaching
in a way that undermines the legitimate sovereignty of a company's home nation. Suppose Acme Corporation is a French pharmaceutical manufacturer, which is also SEC-regulated as a foreign private issuer. The SEC and DOJ launch an investigation
into Acme's activities in selling to state-owned hospitals in Eastern Europe. Assume that France is aware of the conduct the US
is investigating, but that France does not have the same concern
with how drug companies sell their products to state-owned hospitals in Eastern Europe. If France has chosen not to view this
conduct by a French company as improper, it is difficult to see
what business the US has in second-guessing that decision.
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This is not a purely academic point. Until recently, bribing
foreign government officials was not only permissible in large
parts of the world; it was tax deductible. Both Siemens and
Daimler are based in a country-Germany-where this was the
case until 1998.83
A certain amount of hubris drives US policy in this area.
Americans believe they know best how to conduct business internationally, and because it is unlawful to bribe US government
officials to obtain a benefit, they assume that should be the case
everywhere else. The DOJ and SEC also believe that if they enforce the FCPA rigorously, this may have an effect both on how
companies conduct business overseas and also in making other
countries take corruption more seriously. Indeed, US enforcement of the FCPA may help counter a tendency among other
countries to implement lowest-common-denominator regulatory
frameworks designed to attract companies through the appeal of
less stringent and less costly requirements.
Yet citizens of other countries chafe at the notion that
"America knows best," and at the idea that, even if the US is
right, it is the job of the US to impose its view on foreign companies through criminal or civil enforcement actions. Put another
way, if bribery of foreign officials by a French company is bad,
then France should take action. America acting as the world's
policeman has long been a source of strain in US foreign policy,
but it is more troublesome when the legal framework the US
seeks to impose on others is viewed as inconsistent with both the
US's own values (at times) and with the realities of operating on
large swaths of the planet, where petty and less petty corruption
are the way things get done.
The collective result of these three themes-lack of respect
for personal data, intrusive investigative techniques by counsel
viewed as agents of US authorities, and disregard for sovereignty-is that parties outside of the US view the recent aggressive
enforcement of the FCPA against international companies not as
the Lone Ranger riding in on a white horse to save the day, but
rather as a more ambiguous entity, a Clint Eastwood-like mix of
positive and negative, with the threat of overreaching ever present.
83 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Centre for Tax
Policy and Administration, Update on Tax Legislation on the Tax Treatment of Bribes to
ForeignPublic Officials in Countries Party to the OECD Anti Bribery Convention *7 (June
2011), online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/10/41353070.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
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Unintended Consequences

The disconnect between how the US sees its anticorruption
enforcement role and how other countries' companies and citizens see that role has resulted in several unintended consequences.
First, although it is difficult to quantify, there can be no
question that rigorous FCPA enforcement against foreign private
issuers has resulted in fewer foreign companies accessing US
capital markets. Some foreign private issuers, such as Daimler,
have delisted from US exchanges. 84 Others undoubtedly have
chosen to raise capital in Hong Kong, London, Frankfurt, or other stock exchanges that have shown an ability to launch companies into the public markets. The competition for new listings is
fierce, and arguably it is unfortunate that the US exchanges are
losing listings because of the cost of complying with US anticorruption regulations.
It is important to recognize that the decision not to list on a
US exchange is not a tacit admission that a company pays bribes
or wants to pay bribes. Because the SEC and DOJ have taken a
sweeping view of the FCPA's scope (including application to dealings with state-controlled companies, for example) and because
they have insisted that an acceptable antibribery compliance
structure for a typical public company must include costly elements that may not necessarily provide any substantive benefit,85 listing on a US exchange and complying with the FCPA
necessarily imposes substantial costs on a company, even if that
company has no intention of ever paying bribes anywhere.
Second, as discussed previously, aggressive enforcement has,
at times, led foreign companies and citizens to view the US regulators not as policemen but as biased referees who are trying to
punish foreign companies in order to help their US competitors.
84 See Fuhrmans and Stevens, Wall St J 22 (cited in note 73). See also Daimler AG,
SEC Form 15F (cited in note 73); Technip, Press Release, Technip to Apply for the Delisting of its American Depository Shares (ADS) From the New York Stock Exchange and
Deregistration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (July 25, 2007),
online at http://www.technip.com/en/press/technip-apply-delisting-its-american-deposita
ry-shares-ads-new-york-stock-exchange-and-deregis (visited Sept 10, 2012); Technip, SEC
Form 15F, File No 1-15234 (filed Aug 6, 2007). See generally Deutsche Telekom AG, SEC
Form 15F, File No 1-14540 (filed June 23, 2010); Magyar Telekom PLC, SEC Form 15F,
File No 1-14720 (filed Nov 14, 2011).
85 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v PanalpinaWorld Transport
(Holding) Ltd, No 10-CR-769, *C1-C7 (SD Tex filed Oct 27, 2010); Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, United States v Johnson & Johnson, No 1:11-CR-00099-JDB, *31-32 (DDC
filed Apr 8, 2011).

237]

EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCPA

255

This view, whether valid or not, risks inviting countervailing
measures by foreign governments against US companies. Rather
than leveling the playing field, the result could be to legitimize
an ongoing chess game in which countries use their regulatory
enforcement mechanisms to create tactical business advantages
for their locally based businesses.
C.

The Bottom Line

The point of this Article is not to assert that the US government should reduce enforcement of the FCPA against foreign
companies. We believe the world is a better place with less government corruption, and that corporate corruption of government
officials remains a problem in many regions because of the
amount of money involved and the longstanding active or passive
acceptance of corruption. 86 The FCPA is one tool for addressing
that problem. Nonetheless, based on our experience, we believe
the SEC and DOJ could take a number of steps to reduce the
negative collateral effects of enforcement actions against foreign
companies.
First, the SEC and DOJ could defer to foreign government
enforcement authorities. One simple principle seems noncontroversial: if a company's home country is willing to combat corruption at the company, the US should stand down. Standing down,
in our view, does not include exacting a pound of flesh for the US
just because the US holds a knife-it means deferring entirely to
the home-country enforcement process. Increasingly, countries
are enacting or enhancing their own anticorruption laws or enforcing long-existing laws that had been gathering dust. Even if
the US technically could assert jurisdiction in such a circumstance, it would be better off letting the company's home country
proceed-whether or not the SEC and DOJ would agree with the
ultimate outcome of that enforcement action. This principle respects the sovereignty of foreign nations and decreases the risk
that US conduct can be portrayed as heavy-handed or overreaching. A further step might be for US regulators to first bring conduct that comes to their attention to the home country's regulator, in order to give that regulator the opportunity to take action.
Second, US regulators could focus on core violations rather
than wade into the muddy waters of expanding liability under
86 See, for example, Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index
(2011), online at http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi20ll/results/ (visited Sept 10, 2012).
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the FCPA. FCPA enforcement over the past decade has become
an unfortunate example of "mission creep." No longer do the SEC
and DOJ focus their efforts exclusively on payments that everyone would agree are improper, such as briefcases of cash to government officials. Instead, they have expanded into gray areas,
such as noncash benefits to employees at state-owned enterprises
(often in countries where virtually every enterprise that would be
a private company in the US is partly state-owned). As enforcement moves away from conduct that is viewed as immoral or illegal throughout the world, it is more likely that foreign companies, citizens, and even governments will view that enforcement
activity as illegitimate or improperly motivated.
Third, US regulators should consider industry sweeps. One
way to blunt the criticism that the SEC and DOJ are unfairly
targeting foreign competitors of US companies is to use information about how bribes are being paid by one company in an
industry to review conduct by that company's competitorsincluding the US competitors of foreign companies that are under investigation. If one widget manufacturer is bribing officials
in Poland to make sales, for example, the US could consider
whether others might be doing the same thing. Paradoxically,
this recommendation may increase enforcement activity. Very
recently, it appears the government has begun to take this approach in certain industries, such as pharmaceuticals and medical devices.87 Similarly, the Panalpina-related investigations involved a number of companies that were using the same corrupt
freight-forwarder.8 8
Fourth, US regulators should respect international data privacy laws. Admittedly, if our first recommendation is adopted,
this becomes less of an issue. Regulators in Europe and elsewhere regularly conduct investigations while remaining in compliance with local data privacy laws. However, to the extent the
SEC and DOJ continue to conduct international investigations,
they need to devote energy to finding ways to do so in a manner
that is respectful of international data privacy laws. Both agencies have already made efforts to work with European governments in this area, and they should continue to do so. 8 9
87 See Gardiner Harris and Natasha Singer, U.S. Inquiry of Drug Makers Is Widened,
New York Times B (Aug 13, 2010).
88 See DOJ, Press Release, Oil Services Companies and a Freight ForwardingCompany Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More Than $156 Million
in CriminalPenalties (cited in note 21).
89 See DOJ, Press Release, Attorney General Eric Holder Delivers Remarks to the
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IV. CONCLUSION
Since the Statoil enforcement action only six years ago, there
has been a dramatic increase in FCPA enforcement actions
against foreign companies. In this Article, we have evaluated
this recent trend, focusing particularly on the legitimacy and
practical implications of imposing US anticorruption laws on
non-US companies. This brand of "American imperialism" has
prompted negative reactions from foreign companies, foreign
governments, and international media. Much of this backlash
stems from a sense that the US enforcement efforts invade the
sovereignty of companies' home countries. We believe that a few
simple steps could both enhance overall international antibribery
enforcement efforts and simultaneously reduce the level of criticism leveled at the US.

European Parliament'sCommittee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (Sept 20,
2011), online at http: //www.justice.gov/iso/opalag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110920.html
(visited Sept 10, 2012); Michael Dempsey, DataAcross Borders, Financial Times 3 (Nov 8,
2011) (noting that "Washington has heen listening and learning" in terms of understanding European data protection laws).
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